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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH

SALT LAKE CITY, A
Municipal Corporation,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.

CASE NO. 92-0078-CA

TEJA TRUJILLO,
Defendant/Appellant.

Priority No. 2

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. Section 78-2a-3(2)(f) (1992 Supp.)

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

Was the warrant authorizing the search of defendant's
residence supported by probable cause?

2.

Did the magistrate properly authorize the execution of the
search on a no-knock, nighttime basis?

3.

If the search warrant was defective in any of the above
respects, is suppression of the evidence seized during the
search required?

- 1 -

STANDARD OF REVIEW
In considering an appeal of a motion to suppress denial,
the Court of Appeals should give deference to the trial court's
findings of fact, and be governed by a "clearly erroneous"
standard.

State v. Smith, 781 P.2d at 881. Under federal law, a

magistrate's probable cause determination is given great
deference on review.

Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236, 103

S.Ct. 2317, 2331 (1983).

The affidavit supporting a search

warrant application must, however, provide a "substantial basis
for determining the existence of probable cause." Gates, 462 U.S.
at 239, 103 S.Ct. at 2332, quoted in United States v. Leon, 468
U.S. 897, 915, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 3416 (1984).

The "substantial

basis" requirement entails limited review of the magistrate's
determination, asking only whether the affidavit contains
sufficient factual information upon which a magistrate could have
found probable cause.
2326.

See Gates, 462 U.S. at 226, 103 S.Ct. at

The question of whether the state constitution requires

less deferential review is a policy question, and hence one of
law.
A magistrate's authorization of a no-knock, nighttime
search is held to be improper only if the warrant affidavit, read
as whole, fails to support an inference that if the searching
officers first announce their purpose, evidence may be lost, or
physical harm may result to any person.

See State v. Rowe, 806

P.2d 730, 732-33 (Utah App.)(construing Utah Code Ann. ss77-2310(1990)), cert, granted, 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991).

Thus

deferential review of no-knock nighttime authorization is
appropriate.
- 2-

The question of whether a "good faith exception" to the
exclusionary rule exists under the Utah Constitution, as it does
under the United States Constitution, appears to be one of
policy, and therefore law, reviewed without deference to a trial
court's analysis.

See State v. Thompson, 810 P.2d 415, 420 (Utah

1991), and Rowe, 806 P.2d at 740 (Garff, J.,

concurring)(both

deferring the issue).
Questions of law which flow from these factual findings are
to reviewed under a "correctness" standard.

State v. Lopez, 181

Utah Adv. Rep. 41, 42; State v. Steward, 806 P.2d 213, 215 (Utah
App. 1991).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND ORDINANCES
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution and
Article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution contain virtually
identical text.

The fourth amendment reads:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Utah's "no-knock" search warrant statute, Utah Code Ann.
ss77-23-10 (1990), reads, in pertinent part:
When a search warrant has been issued authorizing
entry into any building, room, conveyance, compartment or
other enclosure, the officer executing the warrant may use
such force as is reasonably necessary to enter:
(2) Without notice of his authority and purpose, if
the magistrate issuing the warrant directs in the warrant
that the officer need not give notice. The magistrate
shall so direct only upon proof, under oath, that the
object of the search may be quickly destroyed, disposed of,
or secreted, or that physical harm may result to any person
if notice were given.
- 3 -

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case

involves the denial of a motion to suppress

evidence seized during a warrant-supported search of defendant's
home.

The facts and trial court proceedings are as follows:

Statement of the Facts
The critical facts are set forth in the search warrant
affidavit.

The affidavit was submitted by Paul Gardiner of the

Salt Lake County Metro Narcotics Strike Force, an experienced
narcotics investigator, and had been reviewed by a county
attorney (see affidavit attached to appellants brief as addendum
"C", at 4).

Detective Gardiner sought a warrant to search the

home of the defendant Teja Trujillo, for cocaine, paraphernalia,
packaging materials, currency, narcotics records, and residency
papers (affidavit attachment "a").
The most significant item in the affidavit, as identified
by the trial court, is the recitation by Gardiner, of the events
surrounding the cocaine purchase which took place at the address
in question, within 72 hours prior to the issuance of the warrant
(affidavit at 3).

That purchase was a "controlled buy11, made

through one of the confidential informants.

The informant was

subjected to a pre- and post-purchase search, and kept under
surveillance as he entered and left the home (ijd.).

The

informant reported that the defendant had been present during the
purchase of cocaine at the home.

Additionally, there were two other confidential informants
who gave information to the Metro Narcotics Strike Force on prior
occasions with regards to the defendant and the other two
individuals named in the warrant (affidavit at 3)•
Based on the information available to Detective Gardiner,
and his experience in narcotics investigation, a warrant to
search the persons of defendant and two other individuals who
were present during the "controlled buy" was requested, together
with authorization to search the premises.

The warrant was

sought as a no-knock, nighttime warrant based on Detective
Gardiner's statement that in his experience, drug traffickers
frequently possess firearms, cocaine is easily and quickly
disposed of, and that at this particular address, the residents
did not open their door without asking who it was first.
The warrant and no-knock, nighttime authority were issued
as requested.

The entry and search were carried out, and small

amounts of marijuana were located on the premises.

Trial Court Proceedings
Defendant was charged with unlawful possession of a
controlled substance, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of
11.24.020 of the Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City.

She moved

to suppress the seized evidence.
The motion to suppress asserted only that the "warrant was
invalid", and referenced the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to
the United States Constitution and Article I, section 14 of the
Utah Constitution.

There was no memorandum in support offered,

- 5 -

but at the hearing, defendant indicated that the basis for the
motion to suppress was three fold (see transcript at 1),
The first argument raised by the defendant was with respect
to the reliability of informants, and the standard of scrutiny
employed by the magistrate.

The second issue was with the

truthfulness of the affidavit, and the final issue was with the
issuance of the warrant as a no-knock, nighttime authorization.
The trial court denied the motion to suppress.

It first

found that there was ample probable cause to indicate that the
warrant should be authorized.

The court stated that the

controlled buy, together with the information from the other
confidential informants was sufficient to justify the warrant
being issued, clearly basing this decision on the truthfulness of
Detective Gardiner's details of the controlled buy (transcript at
55) •
The court next addressed the no-knock authorization, and
found that all though there were numerous items to be seized if
found, clearly the primary purpose for the warrant was to search
for cocaine, and the nature of cocaine, being easy to dispose of,
allows for the no-knock warrant authority.
Finally, the court found that the fact that they did not
find what they were looking for, "does not in any way, indicate
that the affidavit is not sufficient on its face11 (transcript at
56) .
The motion to suppress having been denied, the defendant
pleaded guilty

to unlawful possession of a controlled substance,

as charged, reserving her right to appeal the denial of her

-

£

-

motion.

She was sentenced on October 3rd, 1991 to serve 3 0 days

beginning October 4th, 1991. This appeal ensued.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court, having heard the evidence, ruled properly
in finding that Judge Robin W. Reese acted properly in
authorizing a no-knock, nighttime search warrant.
The "no-knockfl, nighttime authorization was proper.

The

standard of proof for such authorization should be lower than
that required to issue the underlying warrant.

This is so

because once a warrant has been issued, concern shifts to a
determination of how the search can most effectively and safely
be conducted.

Here, cocaine, an easily hidden, easily destroyed

or discarded substance was sought; it might be lost if the search
were announced.

More importantly, the fact that drug dealers are

frequently armed, plus specific information about the location of
the cocaine in the defendant's home, supported a no-knock
authorization.
Because there is little question that the underlying
warrant is valid, the City's "good faith exception to
suppression" argument is limited to the closer questions of noknock and nighttime authorization.

If that authorization is

found to be defective, suppression of the seized evidence is
inappropriate.

It is not clear that evidence should ever be

suppressed where the only search defect is an improper no-knock,
nighttime entry.

Further, reasonable officer reliance on a

warrant that is later held defective should weigh against
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suppression, under both federal and state law principles.
Application of this rule is especially justified here, because
the no-knock authority granted in this warrant was completely
consistent with the most recent case holding on the issue.

ARGUMENT

I.

THE MAGISTRATE'S PROBABLE CAUSE DETERMINATION
AND ISSUANCE OF THE SEARCH WARRANT SHOULD BE
REAFFIRMED ON APPEAL
The City treats Points I and II of the defendant's brief on

appeal as a challenge to the magistrate's probable cause
determination and issuance of the underlying search warrant.
Defendant argues that stricter probable cause review should be
undertaken under Article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution
than traditionally occurs under the fourth amendment.

Her

argument should be rejected.
A. The Search Warrant Affidavit Established
Probable Cause that Criminal Evidence Would
be Found in Defendant's Home
The trial court did rule that the underlying warrant was
validly issued, holding that probable cause existed based on the
personal observations of Detective Gardiner, as buttressed by the
three informants.

In reviewing the probable cause ruling and the

issuance of the underlying warrant, defendant's challenge fails
on its merits.
1. Reasons for Deferential Appellate Review
The trial court's "sufficient basis" ruling comported with
the fourth amendment rule that a magistrate's probable cause

determination is deferentially reviewed, and reversed only if it
is clearly erroneous; that is, only if it had no "substantial
basis."

State v. Babbell, 770 P.2d 987, 990-91 (Utah 1989);

State v. Purser, 828 P.2d 515, 516-517 (Utah App. 1992).

Accord

United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 914-15, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 3416
(1984).

Defendant, however, urges a departure from this rule

under Article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution, asking for
non-deferential, de novo review of the magistrate's probable
cause determination.

Derived from concurring comments in State

v. Weaver, 817 P.2d 830 (Utah App. 1991), defendant's argument
should be rejected.
Concurring in Weaver, Judge Orme asked why a search warrant
affidavit should not be reviewed on appeal as "a question of law,
with no particular deference accorded."

817 P.2d at 836.

One

answer is that magistrates, no less than their colleagues on
appellate benches, are sworn to uphold the federal and state
constitutions.

U.S. Const. Art VI, cl. 3; Utah Const. Art. IV,

section 10. Absent the clearest showing that this sworn duty has
been abdicated, a magistrate's probable cause ruling should be
respected as a conscientiously considered decision, made in full
awareness of the involved constitutional principles.
Judge Orme also criticized deferential review of warrants
and warrant affidavits as a means of encouraging police officers
to seek warrants, a rationale advanced by the federal Supreme
Court.

817 P.2d at 83 5.

But if warrant affidavits are

nondeferentially reviewed on appeal, magistrates may feel less
incentive to scrutinize them carefully.

Better to simply issue

the warrant without fuss, and let the appellate court, with the
"luxury of group decision-making, more time, and research
assistance," M . , decide later whether the affidavit was
sufficient.

Thus nondeferential review of warrants may actually

weaken the interpretation of the judicial branch between citizens
and police before a search occurs, interposition that is the
"bulwark" of search and seizure protection.

Franks v. Delaware,

438 U.S. 154, 164, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 2681 (1978).
Additionally, because it occurs before a search, a
magistrate's probable cause determination is arguably more
objective than one made after-the-fact.

Before issuing a search

warrant, the magistrate must find "a fair probability that
contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular
place."

Illinois v. Gate, 462 U.S. 213, 235, 103 S.Ct. 2317,

2332 (1983) (emphasis added).

Hindsight based review of

warrants, however, may be colored by matters extraneous to this
pre-search probable cause determination.
Further, unlike "other writings," such as contracts, a
warrant affidavit merely asks permission to conduct a search.

It

is the magistrate who, upon an assessment that probable cause
exists, issues the "contract," of warrant, ordering officers to
search the identified place.

See Utah Code Ann. section 77-23-1

(1990)("a search warrant is an order . . . directed to a peace
officer . . . " ) .

Thus, principles of contract interpretation,

cf. Weaver, 817 P.2d at 836 (Orme, J., concurring), are
inapplicable to warrant affidavits.

It is also appropriate to defer to a probable cause ruling
that has been affirmed by the trial court after the search, as
occurred here.

In such instances, the defendant has had a full

opportunity to attack the sufficiency of the warrant affidavit.
When such attacks fail, the appellate court faces a situation
wherein two judicial officers have already approved the
challenged search.

Therefore, particularly in a close case,

deference is appropriate, £f. Weaver, 817 P.2d at 835 (Orme, J.,
concuring).

Indeed, reversal upon a two-to-one split appellate

decision would actually reflect a three-to-two determination of
all judges that the warrant was valid.

Thus nondeferential

appellate warrant review could actually foster inconsistent,
unpredictable results.

Cf. State v. Vigil, 815 P.2d 1296, 1299-

1300 (Utah App. 1991) .
Finally, deferential review of search warrants, and of
trial court rulings upholding those warrants, is appropriate in
light of the cost of suppressing evidence:

most typically, a

societal cost is paid, in that guilty defendants go free.

That

cost should be due only upon the clearest showing that the
challenged evidence was obtained in violation of constitutional
rights, especially when front-line magistrates and trial courts
have already ruled to the contrary.
In the end, defendant's argument for de novo appellate
review of warrant-supported searches amounts to an assertion that
such searches should be invalidated if an appellate court
majority decides that it would not have issued the warrant in the
first instance.

This is wrong.

Until and unless appellate
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courts themselves assume the burden of issuing warrants, the
efforts of the traditional front-line judicial decision makers
should be subject to reversal only for clear error.
2. Marshalling the Evidence
Concomitant with express adoption of a "clearly erroneous"
based standard of review for warrant-supported searches under the
state constitution, this Court should apply an evidencemarshalling requirement to such review.

This requirement is

already in place for challenges to criminal guilt findings.

See

State v. Moore, 802 P.2d 732, 738-739 (Utah App. 1990).
Marshalling essentially requires an appellant to confront the
strongest adverse evidence head-on, and to demonstrate why that
evidence does not support the challenged judgement.

Id. at 738.

This "aids the appellate courts in deliberations and in the
opinion-writing process."

Id. at 739.

This case illustrates why the marshalling standard should
also apply to appeals from motions to suppress evidence.
Defendant's appellate brief attempts to evade the impact the
controlled cocaine buy in her home had to have on the
magistrate's decision to issue the warrant.

Defendant's attempt

to confuse the issue of whether the buy actually took place at
the named residence, is a blatant misrepresentation of the facts
that she herself dealt extensively with.

The cross examination

dealt exhaustively with the buy at the named residence from
approximately 3/4 of the way down on page 11 of the transcript,
to half way down page 16, leaving no doubt that the affidavit was
clear on its face, and was not controverted by Detective
Gardiner's testimony at the hearing.

Even a single controlled drug buy, within a week of the
warrant affidavit, is sufficient to establish probable cause.
See State v. Ayala, 762 P.2d 1107, 1110 (Utah App. 1988).

The

controlled buy in this case occurred within 72 hours preceding
this affidavit (affidavit at 3). The City is aware of no case
where a warrant based upon recent controlled buys has been held
invalid.

Even where such purchases are less-than-ideally

controlled, because an "unwitting" intermediary is the conduit
between the confidential informant and the suspected drug dealer,
probable cause determinations and the issuance of warrants have
been upheld on appeal.

See State v. Purser, 828 P.2d 515, 516

(Utah App. 1992), and cases cited therein.
Viewed in this light, defendant's skirting of the
controlled buy issue, and the statements which placed the
defendant present at the controlled buy in her own home
represents, at best, unhelpful appellate briefing.

It suggests

an attempt to confuse the real issues, by deliberately
misconstruing testimony which defendant herself belabored.

To

forestall such problems in the future, once a search warrant has
been issued, or a motion to suppress has be decided in the trial
court, an evidence-marshalling standard should apply to efforts
to reverse those decisions on appeal.
3. "Totality of the Circumstances11 the Test.
Defendant asks this Court to adopt a strict "informant
reliability" approach to probable cause and search warrant
issuance under the Utah Constitution.

This approach is dubbed

the "two-pronged" "Aguilar-Spinelli" test, after Aguilar v.
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Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509 (1964), and Spinelli v. United
States, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S.Ct. 584 (1969).

In essence, the

approach requires that when a search warrant request is supported
by informants' statements, the informants' "basis of knowledge"
and "veracity" must be established for the magistrate.

See

Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 228 nn. 3-4, 103 S.Ct. 2317,
2327 nn. 3-4 (1983).
In Gates, the United States Supreme Court rejected a strict
"informant reliability" approach, adopting instead a common
sense-based, "totality of the circumstances" approach under the
fourth amendment.

4 62 U.S. at 235, 103 S.Ct. at 23 32.

approach has been embraced by Utah's appellate courts.

This
See State

v. Anderson, 701 P.2d 1099, 1101-02 (Utah 1985); State v. Purser,
828 P.2d at 516 (Utah App. 1992).

Informant reliability does

remain a factor in the "totality" analysis.

Anderson, 701 P.2d

at 1101; Purser, 828 P.2d at 516; accord Gates, 462 U.S. at 230,
103 S.Ct. at 2328.

However, where informant reliability is

unsure, independent police investigation can compensate,
establishing probable cause.

See State v. Bailey, 675 P.2d 1203

(Utah 1984)(police investigation corroborated informant's tip).
Defendant argues that under Article I, section 14 of the
Utah Constitution, informant reliability should be a sine qua non
for probable cause and search warrant issuance.

However, Utah

courts have expressed no dissatisfaction or difficulty with the
"totality" approach.

Compare State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460,

466, 469 (Utah 1990)(plurality opinion)(finding federal
automobile search law "intolerably confusing," and attempting to

-

i

A

-

"simplify11 it under the state constitution) .

Indeed, this Court

has applied the test to search warrants under Article I, section
14.

See State v. Miller, 740 P.2d 1363, 1365 (Utah App. 1987).

Accordingly, there is no compelling reason to depart from the
Gates totality of the circumstances test.
Defendant cites a number of cases that reject the totality
of the circumstances approach, retaining an Aguilar-Spinelli
informant reliability requirement under state constitutions.
Often, however, that requirement has been retained in name only,
with the courts holding that informant reliability problems can
be overcome, and probable cause established, through independent
police investigation.

See Commonwealth v. Upton, 476 N.E.2d 548,

557 (Mass. 1985); State v. Jackson, 688 P.2d 136, 144 (Wash.
1984); State v. Jacumin, 778 S.W.2d 430, 437 (Tenn. 1989).

Thus

these decisions actually represent a totality of the
circumstances approach.
Other cases deal with warrants issued solely upon informant
statements, with no independent investigation.

E.g., People v.

Griminger, 71 N.Y.2d 635, 524 N.E.2d 409, 410 (1988) (but failing
to address fruits of earlier consent search as basis for probable
cause); State v. Jones, 706 P.2d 317, 319-20 (Alaska 1985);
People v. Serbine, 421 Mich. 502, 364 N.W.2d 658 (1985).

These

cases properly demonstrate that where informant statements are
the only basis for probable cause, the informants had better be
reliable; this requirement is retained under the totality of the
circumstances test.

See Bailey, 675 P.2d at 1205 ("even under

[the Gates] standard, compliance with the Aguilar-Spinelli
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guidelines may be necessary to make a sufficient basis for
probable cause").
In no case cited by the defendant has a warrant been
invalidated where it was supported, as happened here, by clear
independent evidence of obviously illegal conduct. Therefore,
defendant's argument for a strict "informant reliability"
approach to warrant affidavits is unpersuasive, and should be
rejected.
4, Failure of "Utah History11 Argument.
Finally, a short comment on defendant's historical analysis
of why the Utah Constitution should provide broader search and
seizure protection that the fourth amendment to the United States
Constitution.

Relating heavy-handed searches by federal officers

against pre-statehood Mormon polygamists, defendant asserts that
the framers of Utah's constitution intended "more stringent
requirements" for searches under the state constitution than
existed under the fourth amendment.
This proposition is highly unlikely, when one considers
that the drafters, rather than drafting a significantly different
search and seizure provision, adopted the fourth amendment
practically verbatim.

Utah's provision, Article I section 14,

was apparently approved by the Utah Constitutional Convention
without debate.

Wallentine, Heeding the Call: Search and Seizure

Jurisprudence Under the Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 14,
17 Utah J. Contemp. L. 267, 275 (1991).

Further, Article III of

the Utah Constitution prohibits religious persectuion and outlaws
religious protection and eliminates the root cause of the search
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and seizure abuses that its framers had experienced.

This

strongly suggests that the framers did not intend stronger
general protection against searches and seizures than the fourth
amendment provided; they provided additional protection for
religious practices only.

This case does not involve a search

related to religion, and is thus not entitled to the stronger
protections set forth under Article III.
In sum, defendant's request for de novo appellate review of
search warrants and the supporting affidavits should be rejected
in favor of deference to the front-line magistrates and trial
courts; further, an evidence-marshalling standard should apply to
such review.

Her request for application of a strict "informant

reliability" approach to search warrants under the Utah
Constitution is patently unsound.

Accordingly, the magistrate's

probable cause determination and issuance of the underlying
search warrant in this case, already affirmed by the trial court,
should now be reaffirmed.

II.

THE MAGISTRATE PROPERLY AUTHORIZED THE "NO-KNOCK"
EXECUTION OF THE SEARCH.
Defendant next contends that the magistrate erred in

authorizing the search to be conducted as an "no-knock",
nighttime search.

Under the correct standards of review and

proof for no-knock, nighttime authorization, this argument should
be rejected.
A. No-Knock Warrant Authorization Should be
Deferentially Reviewed for Reasonableness,
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By its terms, Utah's no-knock statute comes into play only
11

[w]hen a search warrant has been issued . . . "

section 77-23-10 (1990).

Utah Code Ann.

Its focus is not probable cause, but

only the question of how the search will be conducted.

See State

v. Buck, 756 P.2d 700, 703 (Utah 1988)(no-knock challenge did not
assail underlying search, but only "the manner of entry").

For

no-knock search, the statute requires "proof" that if the search
is announced, evidence "may" be lost, or that personal physical
harm "may" result.

Utah Code Ann. section 77-23-10(2).

Defendant emphasizes the statutory "proof" requirement,
however, the "may" language should be emphasized, and construed
to require a standard of proof for no-knock authority that is
less than the probable cause standard for issuance of the
underlying warrant.

So long as some case-specific evidence

supports the issuance of a no-knock, nighttime warrant, a
magistrate's authorization should be deferentially reviewed, and
reversed only if it is clearly unreasonable.

There are several

good reasons for such an approach.
First, by definition, a search warrant defeats the privacy
expectation of the subjects of the search.

There is no question

of consent; the search is going to occur even over resistance.
In their expertise, the searching officers can anticipate the
likelihood and form of such resistance, whether efforts to
conceal the sought after contraband are likely, physical
resistance to officer entry or any combination of these things.
In carrying out the warrant's command to enter a particular place
and seize particular things, Utah Code Ann. section 77-23-1
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(1990), officer expertise about how best to follow that command
should be respected.

See Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238,

257, 99 S.Ct. 1682, 1693 (1978)(question of how to conduct
warrant-authorized search "is generally left to the discretion of
the executing officers," subject to reasonableness requirement).
The language of the Utah no-knock statute properly allows the
magistrate to respect that expertise; reviewing courts, in turn,
should defer to the magistrate's no-knock, nighttime
authorization.
Second, where probable cause exists, it is reasonable to
believe that the criminal suspects wish to thwart any search.
The element of surprise may be needed to overcome the suspects'
efforts toward that end.

A request for a no-knock, nighttime

search authority, providing that element, should not be
overscrutinized, especially where the nature of the criminal
activity—such as cocaine dealing—facilitates easy destruction
or secreting of the contraband.

State v. Rowe, 806 P.2d 730,

732-33 (Utah App.), cert, granted, 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991)(small
amounts of drugs suspected).

See also, State v. Miller, 740 P.2d

1363, 1365-67 (Utah App. 1987), and State v. Valento, 405 N.W.2d
914, 920 (Minn. App. 1987)(showing of large-scale operations
supported no-knock authorization).
Finally, a no-knock, nighttime search will often be
advisable for physical safety reasons.

In general, "American

criminals have a long tradition of armed violence, and every year
in this country many law enforcement officers are killed in the
line of duty, and thousands more wounded."
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Terry v. Ohio, 392

U.S. 1, 23, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1881 (1968).

More specifically, Utah

courts have noted that drug dealers are often armed.

State v.

Dorsey, 731 P.2d 1085, 1092 (Utah 1986)(Zimmerman, J.,
concurring); Accord People v. Hughes, 767 P.2d 1201, 1204-05
(Colo. 1989).

Further, in Utah, possession of firearms for

"defense of . • . property" is constitutionally endorsed.
Const. Art. I, section 6.

Utah

The likelihood of violence upon an

unconsented home entry, especially where criminal activity is
already suspected, is therefore very real.
Accordingly, when law enforcement officers have obtained a
warrant, and thereby assumed a duty to search a given place,
their request to enter the place on a no-knock, nighttime basis
should be granted if it is reasonable.

No-knock, nighttime

authority should be refused, or reversed on review, only if no
evidence particular to the case at hand, gleaned from the warrant
affidavit as a whole, supports it.

See Rowe, 806 P.2d at 732-33.

B. The Trial Court Properly Upheld the
Magistrate's No-Knock Search Authorization,
Under the foregoing standard, the magistrate's no-knock,
nighttime authorization should be reaffirmed on appeal. The
trial court noted that ready loss or destruction of the cocaine
in defendant's home was a possibility (transcript at 56).
No-knock authority was also supported as a matter of
safety.

Consistent with the concurrence in Dorsey, cited above,

and with the confirmed criminal history of the defendant, in
combination with the suspected cocaine dealing, it was reasonable
to issue the no-knock, nighttime warrant for safety reasons.
With reasonableness as the standard, this ruling was correct.
— on -

This case clearly shows the safety risk as did State v. Purser,
828 P.2d 516 (Utah App. 1992).

Defendant here had prior criminal

history, as did defendant Purser.
In State v. Roybal, 716 P.2d 291 (Utah 1986), the Court
affirmed the reasonableness of precautions when officers "enter
hostile environs."

_Id. at 293-94 (citing Terry), and a home that

is to be entered pursuant to a probable cause finding is
presumptively "hostile."
Further, affiant Gardiner's statement that "drug
traffickers frequently possess firearms" (affidavit at 6) was not
challenged in defendant's motion to suppress.

Gardiner

specifically states that he "has been on numerous narcotics
search warrants where the suspects have firearms readily
available."
Defendant cites a Washington case State v. Schmidt, 740
P.2d 3 51, as a basis for not granting no-knock warrant, however,
Schmidt appears to overstate the quantum and reliability of proof
that should apply to taking of safety precautions when executing
a search warrant, and appears to contradict the Utah view in
State v. Banks, 720 P.2d 1380, 1381 (Utah 1986).

Therefore, it

should not be considered persuasive.
Defendant cites cases that seem to assert that persons
suspected of drug dealing upon a probable cause finding retain
the same search and seizure protections as do ordinary citizens.
State v. Pierson, 472 N.W.2d 898, 902 (Neb. 1991); State v.
Cleveland, 348 N.W.2d 512 n.6 (Wis. 1984).

This is absurd.

Citizens who are not suspected of crimes cannot be subjected to
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any unwanted police intrusions.

Their rights cannot be compared

to those of people whose "right to be let alone" has already been
overcome by a judicial probable cause finding.

See People v.

Ouellette, 78 111.2d 511, 36 111. Dec. 666, 401 N.E.2d 507, 512
(1979) (Underwood, J., dissenting).
The cases cited by the defendant also implicitly presume
that appellate judges, who do not conduct searches, are better
able than law officers, who do conduct them, to decide the safer
means of carrying out this activity.
Ouellette is more persuasive:

Again, the dissent in

"Were I the officer obliged to

search the occupied apartment of one possessing, and perhaps
using, drugs, and reasonably believed to have a gun, I think I
would prefer not to be warned of my arrival."

401 N.E.2d at 513

(Underwood, J., dissenting).
Finally, cases from other jurisdictions that strictly limit
no-knock searches run contrary to Utah policy.

In State v.

Gardiner, 814 P.2d 568 (Utah 1991), the Utah Supreme Court held
that citizens have no right to forcibly resist even an unlawful
police search, and indeed are criminally liable if they do so.
Id. at 572-576. Again, this search was lawful because of the
underlying warrant.

Consistent with Gardiner, the search cannot

then become unlawful merely because officers anticipated that
defendant might unlawfully resist it, and took reasonable
measures to defeat or prevent such resistance.
Where law enforcement officers, backed by a magistrate,
determine that the risk of physical harm to persons outweighs
problems of fright and property damage, as contemplated by
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section 77-23-10(2), that determination should be affirmed on
review, so long as some minimal, case-specific evidence supports
it.

Such evidence was present here.
In sum, though the risks of evidence loss and physical

danger in an announced search were not certain, they were
sufficient to justify precautions.

In proper deference to the

officers, the magistrate, and the trial court, this Court should
reaffirm the no-knock, nighttime authorization in this search
warrant.
III. IF THE MAGISTRATE'S NO-KNOCK AUTHORIZATION IS
INVALIDATED ON APPEAL, SUPPRESSION OF THE
EVIDENCE IS NOT REQUIRED IN THIS CASE.
As set forth in Point I of this brief, the City believes
that the existence of probable cause to search defendant's home
is unassailable.

This is so even if this Court applies

nondeferential review of the warrant affidavit, on the basis of
the controlled cocaine buy in defendant's home.
Accordingly, in response to defendant's argument that no
"good faith exception" to the suppression of illegally seized
evidence should apply under the Utah Constitution, the City
chooses to address only the possibility that this Court may
disagree with Point II of this brief, dealing with the no-knock
search authorization.

As follows, even if this Court decides

that this no-knock authorization was improper, suppression of the
seized evidence should not be required.
A, Suppression of Evidence Seized During an
Improper No-Knock Search is Not Necessarily
Required in Every Case.
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At the outset, it is not clear that violation of the noknock search statute, Utah Code Ann. section77-23-10 (1990) ,
compels suppression of evidence in any case.

Although Rowe

follows cases from other jurisdictions holding that suppression
is required when a search runs afoul of a statute, 806 P.2d at
738-39 (nighttime search), the issue is actually still open.
Other courts have concluded that suppression is not always
required where evidence is seized in violation of a no-knock
statute.

See State v. Ford, 801 P.2d 754, 764-66 (Or. 1990), and

State v. Brock, 295 Or. 15, 653 P.2d 543, 547 (1982)(suppression
not required for violation of knock-and-announce or daytime
search rules); People v. Payton, 45 N.Y.2d 300, 408 N.Y.S.2d 395,
380 N.E.2d 224 (1978), rev'd on other grounds, 445 U.S. 573, 100
S.Ct. 1371(1980); Commonwealth v. Mason, 507 Pa. 396, 490 A.2d
421, 423-24 (1985).

See also United States v. Searp, 586 F.2d

1117, 1122,-24 (6th Cir. 1978)(nighttime search)(suppression not
always required for violation of procedural rules), cert denied,
440 U.S. 921, 99 S.Ct. 1247 (1979).
Further in State v. Fixel, 744 P.2d 1366, 1368-69 (Utah
1987) , the Utah Supreme Court declined to suppress evidence
obtained by an officer outside his geographic jurisdiction, but
who did not act in an "outrageous" manner.

Holding that

suppression would be a disproportionate remedy, the Court stated
that "[t]he officer/s conduct may warrant official sanctions,
discipline, and/or civil and criminal liability."

Id. at 1369.

Later, in State v. Buck, 756 P.2d 700 (Utah 1988), the
Court, faced with a no-knock search that had not been authorized
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in the warrant, did not hold that suppression would necessarily
be the remedy.

The Court did not reach this question, because

nobody had been home when the no-knock entry occurred, and
therefore the special concerns underlying the knock-and-announce
rule had not been implicated.

756 P.2d at 701-03.

The Buck

concurrence stated that even if the no-knock statute were
deliberately violated, some "suitable remedy" would be fashioned.
Id. at 703 (Zimmerman, J., concurring, joined by Durham, J.).
This suggest that suppression—the normal remedy for a
constitutional violation—may not be required when officers
violate Utah's no-knock statute.
It therefore seems sensible, instead of automatically
suppressing evidence seized in an improper no-knock search, to
consider an alternative remedy, such as ordering the offending
officers or their department to pay for property damage caused by
their entry.

Such an alternative remedy seems especially

appropriate where, as here, the underlying warrant is amply
supported by probable cause.

See Buck, 756 P.2d at 703.

That

warrant obliged the officers to seize the evidence in question;
that obligation should not be undone merely because the seizure
was effected by some problematic, but not outrageous, means.
B. A "Reasonable Reliance" Exception to the
Suppression of Evidence Seized Pursuant to a
Defective Warrant Is Appropriate Under the
Utah Constitution.
In demanding suppression of the evidence, defendant also
asks this Court, utilizing the Utah Constitution, to reject the
so-called "good faith exception" to suppression of unlawfully
seized evidence.

This exception exists under the federal
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constitution by virtue of United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897,
104 S.Ct. 3405 (1984).

Leon avoids suppression of evidence

seized pursuant to a subsequently-invalidated search warrant,
provided that officers conducting the search believed in good
faith that the warrant was valid.
Defendant has not argued that the magistrate here abandoned
his neutral role, and has blatantly misrepresented the issue of
truthfulness on the part of the affiant Gardiner.

Nor does she

argue that the officers could not have reasonably believed that
the no-knock, nighttime authorization in this otherwise valid
warrant was proper.

Nevertheless, casting Leon as a threat to

"fundamental principles," she argues that its reasonable reliance
test should be rejected under the Utah Constitution.

Utah

appellate courts have not yet decided this question.

See State

v. Thompson, 810 P.2d 415, 420 (Utah 1991), and State v. Rowe,
806 P.2d 730, 740 (Utah App.)(Garff, J., concurring)(deferring
the issue), cert, granted, 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991).
C. Reversal of the No-Knock Authorization Would
Require Overruling this Courts Precedent,
Invalidation of this no-knock, nighttime authorization will
require more than rejection of the City's arguments in Point II
of this brief.

This Court's own construction of the no-knock

statute in Rowe will also have to be overruled, either by this
Court or by the Utah Supreme Court, which has heard Rowe on
certiorari, and now has it under advisement.
The warrant affiant in Rowe had simply checked a preprinted
no-knock request on the warrant affidavit, and stated that the
sought-after contraband, narcotics in the residence, could be
-
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easily destroyed,

806 P.2d at 732. The affiant did not allege a

safety risk, another basis for a no-knock search under section
77-23-10.

Nevertheless, this Court affirmed the no-knock

authorization upon the "sparse" affidavit, agreeing that "[t]he
small amount of drugs ordinarily found in a residential setting
can be easily and quickly destroyed with even the briefest
notice."

806 P.2d at 733.

Clearly this no-knock request was more complete than the
one approved in Rowe.

Affiant Gardiner, based on his experience,

believed that the sought-after cocaine could be easily concealed
or destroyed upon an announced search (affidavit at 5).

His

experience had also taught him that drug dealers are often armed,
and this safety concern was buttressed by specific evidence of a
criminal history.
This affidavit therefore alleged both statutory bases for
no-knock authority, and supported these allegations better than
did Rowe in its affidavit.

Accordingly, the Rowe standard for

no-knock searches will have to be overruled before the no-knock
authority in this case can be invalidated.
D. Reliance on this Court's No-Knock Search
Standard, Requires a Reasonable Reliance
Exception to Suppression of Evidence.
Even if the Rowe no-knock standard is overruled, this Court
should hold that it was reasonably relied upon here.

This

warrant affidavit was submitted on March 5, 1991, one month after
Rowe was issued.

Thus Rowe's construction of the no-knock

statute was fresh and controlling law.
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Given that all parties involved can be charged with a
knowledge of Rowe, if this Court determines that no-knock
authority was improperly granted here, a "reasonable reliance"
exception to suppression of the seized evidence is not merely
permissible, but advisable.
misconduct:

Suppression will not deter police

affiant Gardiner exceeded this Court's requirements

for a no-knock request.

Nor would suppression promote better

affidavit scrutiny by prosecutors and magistrates:

charged with

upholding the law as authoritatively construed, they must
necessarily rely on fresh appellate opinions as their guides.
Rowe was just such an opinion here.
Suppression of the evidence here would instead have
undesirable results, not limited to defendant's evasion of
criminal liability.

Worse, suppression would essentially tell

law enforcement officers that legal advice, magistrate authority,
and contemporary case law are near-worthless guides to their
conduct, and that warrants are not worth the trouble.
deeply cynical view should not be fostered.

Such a

Indeed, such a view

would erode freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures, by
discouraging the interposition of the judicial branch between law
enforcement officers and citizens before searches occur.
In the end, unless Rowe is both overruled and declared so
outlandishly incorrect that no properly trained officer,
prosecutor, or magistrate could rely upon it, suppression of the
evidence seized in this no-knock search should not be ordered.
Instead, the proper standard for no-knock authority should be
spelled out, and prospectively applied.

•
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In the meantime, no-

knock search warrants that comply with Rowe, such as this one,
should not have their fruits suppressed.

CONCLUSION
This search warrant was supported by probable cause, and
the no-knock, nighttime authority granted in the warrant was in
compliance with the law. Therefore, the trial court correctly
denied defendant's motion to suppress the evidence seized
pursuant to the warrant.

For these reasons, defendant's

conviction should be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted this

51 ^"^ d^y of

\J-

1992

STEPHEN P. ZOLLINGER
Assistant City Prosecutor

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the

3 1 — day of XXULS^—AJ-TL_

,

1992, I caused to be delivered, four (4) true and correct copies
of the Brief of Appellee to Rich Mauro, Esq., Legal Defender
Assoc, 424 East 500 South, Suite 300, Salt Lake City, Utah
34111.

^tLAl_ ^ > — ^

- ?q -

